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Abstract 
Against two extreme forms of thinking, which have influenced planning theory, this 
paper argues, in the context of a looming amount of literature generated in a 
movement for private planning, that the distinction between private planning and public 
planning is a valid one, but one in need of tweaking.  However, the plan-market 
dichotomy (i.e., the assumption that state and private planning is mutually exclusive), is 
fallacious.  Informed by the neo-institutional economic assumption of rational decisions 
and the stance of contractual solutions, it rides on the surge in private planning by 
proposing a taxonomy of planning that combines two modes of planning with two types 
of planning agent and discusses their possible interrelationships using some neo-
institutional economic reasoning informed by the ideas of Coase.  Some pedagogical and 
theoretical implications are also discussed. 
 
 
                                                                 
1 This paper was developed on the basis of a presentation (Lai 2013) to the Symposium: 
Institutions of Land Rights and Sustainable Asian Urbanization, held at the Global Asia 
Institute, National University of Singapore, on 19 November 2013. 
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Introduction 
Houston has never adopted a zoning ordinance, but it does 
have sub-division controls and a building code.  The 
subdivision regulations contain controls over land 
development generally common elsewhere in the country.  
These controls were first adopted in 1940 and it is estimated 
by the City Planning Director, Roscoe H. Jones, that three-
quarters of the built-up areas were subject to them.  The 
city has a building code typical of those in the Southwest 
(Siegan 1970: pp.71-72, Italics author’s). 
 
The most famous libertarian 2 case for private planning is the supposedly non-zoning 
regime of Houston popularized by Professor Bernard Siegan.  The title of his famous 
paper, “Non Zoning in Houston,” was magic because everyone seemed to think that it 
was a hard case against any trace of government planning and nobody detected from 
the essential details quoted above to realize that Houston is a bona fide planned city.  In 
addition to its restrictive covenants, Houston had a host of subdivision and building 
codes imposed by the state, which Siegan correctly described as “‘zoning-like’ 
requirements” (p.76) and, behold, a City Planning Director who headed a City Planning 
Commission, which “requires substantial dedication of land by sub-dividers for rights of 
way for major thoroughfares” and a traffic department to regulate traffic, ingresses, and 
egresses (Siegan 1970: p.99)!  The situation was summarised this way: “use and 
development are controlled a relatively limited number of land-use ordinances” (Siegan 
1997:p. 198).  In other words, it is not free from “planning by edict” (Lai 1994, 1996a, 
1997a; Webster and Lai 2003). 
Siegan’s work was personally read and corrected by Professor Ronald Coase as 
his standard practice of being the then-Editor of the Journal of Law and Economics at a 
time when his University of Chicago colleague, George Stigler, later also a Nobel 
laureate, formulated the invariant and optimality versions of the Coase Theorem, which 
are known, respectively, as the First Coase Theorem and Second Coase Theorem.  Based 
on a story in Coase’s (1960) paper, these and other sister theorems recognised by 
economists form the theoretical ground for this paper. 
Coase Theorems as planning theorems  
                                                                 
2 The term, “libertarian,” here is generally taken to refer to anyone ranging from 
anarcho-capitalist to minarchist who does not favour state planning as a matter of 
principle. 
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Economists and planners may not be aware of the fact that the factual background 
behind and substance of the Coase Theorems are bona fide land use planning matter.  
The story in the 1960 work of Coase is a land use conflict one between two adjoining 
plots of land.  In line with the Pigovian interventionist thinking, zoning was mentioned as 
a possible option, a limiting case in Coasian understanding, for overcoming the spillover 
effects of the use of one plot on that of the other, although the trading of rights 
between the two landowners in the absence of court adjudication or state planner’s 
professional determination was advanced as a solution.  This Coasian solution is 
invariant to the initial assignment of rights, whether by law or custom, according to the 
First Coase Theorem, and is always Paretian efficient, according to the Second.  
However, both theorems specify that this efficient contractarian solution is possible only 
IF property rights (in the sense of land boundary delineations) are clearly specified and 
IF no other transaction cost exists.  While an interventionist can rely on the “corollary” 
of these theorems to justify the Pigovian solution as applicable to the real world of 
positive transaction costs, the theorems open a new window to classifying planning as a 
conscious rational-teleological act of man (Moroni 2010; Alexander et al. 2012), which 
can be contractual (based on mutual consent) and obligatory.  This form of 
differentiation is significant in light of the tremendous efforts by scholars such as 
Foldvary (2009, 2011) to draw a distinction between private and public planning, which 
is not necessarily the same as planning by the state vs. planning by a non-state (private 
in this sense) party.  As will be elaborated on in this paper and formalised into a matrix, 
both planning by contract and planning by edict (Lai 1994, 1996a, 1997a, Webster and 
Lai 2003) can be mutually inclusive and practised by the state or a private (non-state) 
party. 
In this context, for Siegan’s Houston example to exploit the First and Second 
Coase Theorems could have been presented as a classic case of planning by contract 
among individual land owners within a framework of planning by edict imposed by the 
state.  This was but one of many examples used, rightly or wrongly, in the literature to 
uphold the dichotomy between planning and the market.  It has died hard, although it 
has been reinterpreted by scholars such as Alexander (2001a, 2008) and Staley Claeys 
(2005).3 The former is seen as a product of rational design representing public interest, 
                                                                 
3 Probably due to Hellenistic thinking that sees contradictions in ideas, matter, and the 
soul and body, dichotomies are plentiful in scholarly endeavours.  A dichotomy is not 
dualistic, though in the literature on socialist economies, the term, “plan-market 
dichotomy,” is sometimes used to describe a mixture of the market in the consumption 
sector and planning in the investment sector.  To neo-institutional economists, this is 
absurd.  Tomlinson’s (1987) review of Hare’s book, Planning the British Economy, used 
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whereas the latter is seen as an outcome of the impersonal forces of supply and 
demand based on private interest. Table 1 summarises and compares the key features 
of the plan and market operations. 
Table 1: The plan-market comparison 
 Plan Market 
 
Mode of rationality Hierarchical rational 
decision-making by 
government planners to 
impose constraints on the 
market, and to enable new 
possibilities. 
(Coase 1937, Webster and 
Lai 2003) 
Contractual rational 
decision-making by 
individuals subject to legal 
constraints and 
competition, i.e. demand 
and supply. 
Decision makers State officials Private individuals 
 
Interest Public interest Private interest 
 
Mechanism Use of discretion and 
professional judgement 
 
 
Utility or profit 
maximization 
 
For a long time, town planning, understood as a state activity that regulated the 
land market, was associated with planning theorists and practitioners with legislative 
control of “changes in use” and land development by the private sector.  Such control 
was typically exerted by the imposition of a system of town plans produced under state 
planning legislations, each covering a large number of individually-owned properties and 
produced under a planning act or ordinance that unilaterally modified existing private 
property rights over land.  While such a modification can enlarge the original bundle of 
rights, in practice, it invariably attenuated, compromised, or extinguished existing 
private property rights (Lai 1994, 1996a, 1997a).  The worst case was one in which 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
the term in a dualistic sense.  He asserted that the alignment of the political left in 
democratic countries with planning was due more to its hostility to the market than to a 
general preference for planning.  He doubted that central economic planning was really 
that bad by referencing the survival value of the USSR’s central economic planning 
model.  That model collapsed within four years of his publication.  Hefetz and Warner 
(2007) sought to go beyond it in outsourcing, but ended up telling the story of a reversal 
of policy from market (outsourcing) to firm coordination. 
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public power was used to confiscate private property for non-public use and/or was not 
backed by just, if any, compensation (Lai 2002).  This legislative or statutory interference 
in the rights of property owners and the degree of freedom of developers, known as 
“planning by edict,” as mentioned above, regulated the private planning of individuals 
and was often justified on the basis of the public interest concerning the environment, if 
not also on the grounds of social equity.  The social concern with equity was sometimes 
driven by contempt for the concept of private property.  Its proponents could hardly 
accept the natural law concept of property as an institution for the common good.  In 
this setting, the traditional plan-market distinction died hard and did a great disservice 
to planning as a professional endeavour based on the acts of man. 
During the Cold War, this dichotomy was seen at the level of international 
politics as a competition between central economic planning by socialist regimes led by 
the Soviet Union and the market economy (or “capitalism”) of Western democracies 
with the United States of America as its custodian.  The former stood for oppression and 
the latter for individual freedom and liberty. 4  The demise of the former and the 
financial problems of Western governments during the 1980s marked the decline of 
faith in planning for urban growth in Western planning schools.  This corresponded to 
the sociological reality due to “population control,” which has to do with what planners 
now describe as “shrinking cities” (Pallagst 2010).  In the midst of the crisis when 
planning had to be content with “problem-solving orientation and its pragmatism” in 
what is known as “urban management,” planning students of the time might have found 
Isserman’s (1985) “dare to plan” exhortation in Town Planning Review to be visionary 
rather than something in the “foreseeable future”.  Cole (2001) dared not invoke 
comprehensive or master planning, although he was inspired by Isserman (1985).  As 
the late Professor, Gordon Cherry (1996: p.218), concluded: “The comprehensive 
dirigisme that planning aspired to, and which town planning echoed in its wake, could 
not be sustained.  This by itself did not invalidate the practice of town planning but it 
severely weakened its intellectual credentials and reduced its operational activities.”  
Today, libertarian economics wield a heavy influence on planning theories and practice.  
Voices on the potency of the market in handling urban problems are loud and clear. 
Lacking intellectual support and theoretical tools or vocabulary to engage in 
scholarly debate, government planners and their supporters cynically dismiss academic 
free market theories as lobbyists’ propaganda that anything private goes.5  They have 
regained much ground lost some 30 years ago during an active phase of deregulation 
                                                                 
4 See, for instance, the comment in Havel (2014: p.623). 
5 See the debate between Lai (1996b, 1997b) and Ng (1996). 
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and privatization by pointing out the threats of the market to sustainable development, 
though few have clearly explained what this concept means in concrete or abstract 
terms.  Hardly effectively opposed in theory, free market thinkers run the risk of 
enjoying themselves in monologues against planning polices to the extent that they can 
lose sight of government planning policies that are pro-market and private planning that 
is objectionable. 
Before we develop a taxonomy of planning that clarifies our thoughts, we need 
to explain two intellectual approaches that challenge government planning as rational 
actions by the state to shape future environment, land use, transport or built form of a 
place and is a government plan that controls land uses and built forms in a town as 
references for our elaboration.  Alexander (2008) sought to explain the futility of this 
dichotomy by arguing that “‘planning’ and ‘markets’ are not analytically or empirically 
distinguishable,” which is actually taken to mean “separable”.  The taxonomy presented 
here would illustrate the ways in which this is the case. 
Two forms of objection to state planning 
There is certainly a continuum of criticisms of state planning: at one end, which 
are those convivial in disposition that seek better ways to reform government planning, 
and some that seek to purge state involvement in planning at the other end.  Of these, 
some are far more ideological, theory-laden, and uncompromising, while others are 
more poetic and pragmatic.  In terms of ideology, some support planning, as in the case 
of the Pigovians; others are theoretically neutral, but allow market solutions, as in the 
case of the Coasians (Coase 1960; Dahlman 1979).  Still others are pro-market, as in the 
case of Austrian economists like Hayek (1944).  For this paper, two iconic ways to 
rebuke state planning as a matter of principle are invoked. 
The first is a fundamentalist state failure challenge: planning, as a rational action 
by the state, can never succeed given the state’s inherent limitations.  This view is 
sometimes associated with that of Aaron Wildavsky (1973), whose polemic and nihilist 
writing style neutralized his impact (Alexander 1981), but was definitely better argued 
by the followers of the Austrian School of Economics led by Friedrich Hayek (1941, 1960) 
and analytically treated by students of neo-institutional economics (Lai 1999, 2007) 
attributed to Ronald Coase (1959, 1960, 1974). 
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Wildavsky’s paper, as an icon of the nihilist challenge to state failure, could stand 
in sharp contrast to the convivial critiques6 on planning by Sir Peter Hall (1980), Jane 
Jacobs (1968), James Scott (1988), and Sam Bass Warner (1968), all of whom are so 
influential that their views must be taken seriously with great respect. 
“If planning is everything, maybe it’s nothing,” claimed Wildavsky (1973).  Meyer 
(2011) interpreted the gist of Wildavsky’s paper as advancing the view that “when a 
concept becomes everything to everybody, solving all, then the concept becomes 
meaningless” (p.5).  Forbear for the moment the illogicality of equating existence with 
non-existence this claim entails.  What Wildavsky tried to say was that because all 
rational actions are planned, therefore one cannot find any instance of non-planning in 
conscious human actions.  However, although he eclectically used some biblical terms, 
Wildavsky did not attempt to employ philosophy or the theology of planning, but 
wanted to point out that state planning did not always work and, in fact, usually went 
wrong.  He did not explain how and why state planning came into existence in the first 
place and if it could be reformed or replaced by private planning. 
Wildavsky’s nihilism, as a disguised form of gnoseology, influenced a branch of 
planning theory influenced by concepts in the sociology of knowledge and, more 
recently, analytical philosophy (Lord 2013), which this paper, limited to its Coasian 
                                                                 
6 The author is grateful to a referee for this comment.  Hall always writes with great 
humor and reservation rather than with the sarcastic rhetoric of Wildavsky.  In one of 
his recent works (2014: p.61) for RTPI London, he stated that, “We need not less 
planning but more positive planning by well-equipped multi-skilled teams, making 
masterplans which are then implemented by private developers or cooperatives.”  This 
was the case with Lai (1998, 2005, 2010, 2014), who advocated land leases as state 
plans on sale (master plans!).  Back in 1999, Hall wrote that from 1975 to 1987, 
“Conventional planning, the use of plans and regulations to guide the use of land, 
seemed more and more discredited” (Hall 1999: p.344).  Then, he did not distinguish 
plans that were entered into contractually in Hong Kong, which he identified as a ‘city of 
enterprise’ from the plans produced and imposed by edict.  Jacob (1968: p.1) did not 
reject any planning by the state, but simply did the job of “setting forth new principles” 
(i.e., her own sets of planning maxims), which are PRODUCTS OF REASON.  Interestingly, 
though Scott’s (1998) book has the short title of why plans failed, he actually concluded 
that they, “when allied with state power, would enable much of the reality they 
depicted to be remade” (p.3), which is an excellent antidote against Wildavsky!  Note 
that the short title of Scott’s book was carefully worded, “how certain schemes,” which 
was modest and correct for not condemning all schemes as bankrupt.  Bass Warner 
(1968), on page 3 of his famous work, showed a layout of Downtown Philadelphia, 
which can only be explained by referencing state plans. 
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empirical stance, did not examine.7  This stance is exactly that of G.E. Moore’s “here is 
one hand”. 
While Wildavsky did not systematically explain why the state failed in planning, 
he agreed that it suffered from knowledge constraints (Wildavsky 1973: p.131).  Before 
that, the Hayekeans had argued on the basis of information discovery and the Coasians 
on the basis of transaction cost constraints that the state was severely handicapped in 
trying to achieve its aims to intervene in the land market. 
As correctly pointed by James Meadowcroft, Wildavsky’s analysis is “not 
without confusion and inconsistency” (1997: p.437).  One source of confusion is that he 
made no distinction between “what is good for planning” and “what is planning good 
for” by assuming that planning can only be of one kind (i.e., one that he recognised).  
Therefore, it was not surprising that he adopted a highly restrictive definition of 
planning that bundled his views on rationality in planning, which is a standard economic 
tenet, with “a series of related actions over time designed to achieve them”.  This was 
followed in the same vein by management expert Mintzberg, who saw planning as 
“formalised procedures and articulate results” (Mintzberg 1981: pp.321-322) and was 
rightly capitalized in Alexander‘s paper published in the same year, which pointed out 
that Wildavsky discussed “long range economic national planning” during the mature 
phase of the Cold War. 
In fact, that bundling together of rational decisions with means to achieve goals 
was unnecessary for most types of land use planning in a market economy, as normally 
it is the development market that implements the state plan – taking it as both as an 
“institutional constraint” and a means to assign and reassign property rights  (Webster 
and Lai 2003) and, as explained below, the implementation of which can be 
accomplished by contract without the state “doing it herself” because the state can 
grant franchise licences for private firms to implement her planned programmes.  
Examples of “doing it herself” include a private business firm or a centrally planned 
economy during the Cold War, as both are “firms” (Coase 1937, Hayek 1944, Webster 
and Lai 2003) that make and implement decisions in a “hierarchical” manner.  The 
definition of planning adopted here focuses on the town plan and leaves open the 
modes of execution, which are contingent on the “economic system” in question.  It 
would satisfy Tomlinson’s (1987) “minimal view of planning” as one in which “the state 
deliberately alter[s] by some means or another the composition of output to something 
other than it would be in the absence of intervention” (p.63). 
                                                                 
7 For a good example, see Inch (2012), who referred to the significant concept of spatial 
planning as “an empty signifier” of Gunder and Hillier (2009). 
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Alexander opined that Wildavsky committed the three logical fallacies of 
“composition,” “evaluation,” and “voluntarism”. This was the first significant 
philosophical inquiry into Wildavsky’s (1973) treatise.  The first fallacy Alexander found 
in Wildavsky’s work was for concentrating on “long range economic national economic 
planning” (Alexander‘s 1981: p.132).  The second fallacy was that Wildavsky did not 
explain how the world would look “without the types of planning” in question 
(Alexander‘s 1981: p.133).  The third fallacy was that Wildavsky’s understanding of 
planning as “the attempt to control [the] consequences of our actions” cannot square 
with planning as “continual, universal and involuntary,” as motivated by impulses 
(Alexander 1981: p.134).  Alexander discounted the value of “rational control” of the 
future and advanced Henry Hightower’s view that “planning as a process of…human 
thought” was based on “aforethought” (Alexander 1981: p.135) as a better 
characterization of planning, as that would shift the focus away from the tricky question 
of “how to make decisions more ‘rational’,” but also “how to improve the quality of an 
action” (Alexander 1981: p.136).  This view is exactly the famous dictum of 
Eisenhower’s “plans are nothing, planning is everything” (Ika and Saint-Macary 2012: 
p.423).  On the other hand, Meadowcroft found that Wildavsky indeed sought to shift 
the focus of discussion to the planning “process,” which is not any specific national 
planning process, but one of “conventional governmental planning” (Meadowcroft 1997: 
433).  Planning by businesses and individuals was not the focus of Wildavsky. 
To engage Wildavsky on his terms, which articulate well with Coasian economic 
inquiry, we accept that rational control of future land use and the built form to be the 
basis of the “genus” of planning, with genus being a formal logical attribute of an act of 
man, is one that is voluntary (Lai forthcoming).  This approach is the most 
unsophisticated view of “development control,” as the expression literally suggests. 
The second challenge displayed a philosophical hostility towards and rejection of 
rational decisions or designs in favour of evolutionary and spontaneous acts of man as 
the driving force of social progress.  The concept of “self-planning” or “self-organisation” 
(see, for instance, Portugali (1999) and Neuwirth (2005)) is in this vein.  Though not part 
of “mainstream” planning, it is growing in influence via various forms of “spontaneous 
planning” (Lai and Lorne 2014) that leave no room for effectual, not to mention 
dominant, rational design, which is part and parcel of planning by contract, which, in 
turn, is predicated on a solid choice-theoretic base. 
While both challenges shared a common ground, namely the viability and 
creativity of the free market in handling many problems better than state planning, this 
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form assumed that the market can be completely autonomous and, therefore, can be 
described as a challenge of “market anarchism” or, more precisely, anarcho-capitalism. 
The following discussion will show that the libertarian stance, which regards 
state planning as inherently oppressive and private planning as always consensual, of 
theorizing planning is problematic not only because private planning can be as, if not 
more, oppressive than state planning, but also because state planning underlies even 
the most dramatic forms of private planning and, in fact, can be combined harmoniously 
and successfully with private planning.  In short, private and state planning are not 
mutually exclusive. 
 
Objectionable private planning: planning by might and mutual neglect 
Anarcho-capitalists, who are extreme market anarchists,8 have three real life examples 
of bad private planning to address.  All violate any principle of subsidiarity (Rivolin 2005; 
Brunetta and Moroni 2012) and point to the need for the state as a state, which is a 
matter of political economy which even Nozick (1974) accepted (Lai 2002).  
First, any market that does not work on the basis of consent can be highly 
oppressive.  The end user of property — the homebuyer or business operator — is 
indeed a recipient of public and/or private planning without having participated in prior 
planning decisions. While there is a growing body of literature on the governance of 
gated communities and other forms of private planning, there is little work on mis-
management,9 which is worth investigating.  How can one deal with oppressive post-
contractual private planning by a financially powerful developer who has, in effect, 
become a private government that administers a property development after it is 
occupied by multiple owners?  This type of private government, not uncommon in gated 
communities, is usually in the form of a condominium or strata development.  If the 
state can be blunt and less than wise in planning, so can a private firm.  A private 
government can be no better or even worse than the state in planning. (Lai forthcoming) 
In Colonial Hong Kong, a private corporation, Wong Wai Chuk Tong, became the 
land government of an island called Cheung Chau.  It did not perform the role of a good 
                                                                 
8 As market anarchism, as a form of libertarianism, evolves, a refined distinction 
between anarcho-capitalists and “minarchists” has emerged.  Minarchists like Nozick 
(1974) accept the state, even if only in minimal form, as a night-watchman.  Anarcho-
capitalists Iike Friedman (1971) and Rothbard (1973) do not. 
9 A good reference to the American experience can be found in Stansky (1988).  
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landlord, but simply collected regular charges from proprietors and developers.  In Hong 
Kong, a developer who sells units in a building is under a Deed of Mutual Covenant and 
will be its first property manager.  Abuses by this manager can lead to a legal provision 
for the unit owners to get rid of it and replace it with a corporation (“Incorporated 
owner” or “IO”) they can form by a majority vote.  The dilemma remains that the 
owners may jump out of the frying pan of a dictatorial management company, usually 
owned by a big developer group, and into the fire of another company, the “IO” that has 
been hijacked by low time cost, but incompetent and factious, incorporated managers 
they elect.  
Second, how can one deal with scenarios of “might makes right” depicted by 
Charles Tilly (1997) and John Umbeck (1981), as is the case when the power of the state 
as a protector of all in a given territory is completely absent or ineffectual?  Gangs 
actually impose de facto zoning for the purposes of “taxation” (extortion) and exchange 
and production (operation of illegal businesses).  Unless they, which, in economic terms, 
are a kind of private “firm,” are treated as “states,” their planning is definitely private. 
Anarcho-capitalists may reply that the above problems should be the business of 
a private court and police rather than any state planning machinery.  However, in the 
final analysis, the state needs to be in place to operate a state court and police to deal 
with anything the private courts and marshals fail to handle.  In any event, anarcho-
capitalists need to face the problem in which private individuals in a development 
without any form of government, public or private, neglect the collective environment 
while they enjoy their own private domains.  One possible reply is that if they allow their 
collective environment to deteriorate, it would simply mean that, subjectively speaking, 
the problem is not for them to worry about and any third party who is hurt, but is 
unwilling or unable to pay for improvements, is not really injured.  Here, the interest of 
the third party, or public interest, would be the decisive value at stake in the debate 
over state planning.  Nothing in the planning literature openly embraces this form of 
Social Darwinism, which is certainly not a universal value. 
 
Essential state planning cannot be eradicated 
It is impossible to get rid of the state as “a planner”.  The major common problem 
confronting advocates of private planning is that it is impossible for them to provide any 
real life example of private planning in the absence of state planning of some form.  
They can hardly “control” the state in the sense that their examples of successful private 
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planning did not have to go through a state regulatory process or take place without a 
land use-transport structure shaped and protected by the state. 
Recall the case of Houston.  Siegan’s 1970 work on this city traced the origins of 
land use control back to 1940, but it did not go far enough.  By 1940, a city planning 
department had been established and subdivision codes imposed in Houston. 
Siegan did not describe how individual land parcels in Houston started, which 
was no historical triviality.  Were they granted individually at no cost by the state or the 
federal government?  Or were they subdivided from one private parent lot obtained in a 
way that is subject to the former question?  In any case, even discounting all 
subdivisions and building codes, Houston was planned/zoned with public roads, so here, 
the presence of the visible hand of the state in planning cannot be dismissed. 
It may well be the case that much of the debate over what Houston represents 
seems to hinge on the basic Anglo-American confusion over what planning means.  
Houston has ALWAYS been planned, unless planning is not considered planning.  It was 
only “un-zoned” in the sense that there was no planning produced under a municipal 
zoning law, as evidence adduced from Siegan’s paper on Houston at the beginning of 
this paper showed.  This work has, unfortunately, been misread by those who thought 
that Houston was unplanned.  Planning historians should note that Siegan’s work did 
not refer to the first legal case study on private planning through restrictive covenants 
by Beuscher (1958), who used the term “private zoning” to describe land use control in 
Milwaukee, which, in essence, resembled the Houston model. Probably, had Beuscher 
not used the word “zoning” in the title of his work, Milwaukee would have become 
equally if not more famous than Houston.  
There are surely other good and valid reasons for state planning to benefit or 
empower, by default or otherwise, bona fide private planning, including setting 
examples for (often superior) market imitations and improvements (Lai 2004).  The 
emphasis here is not so much the credibility of successful instances of state planning, 
but those elements of indispensable government planning that subsist in any classic 
case of “private planning,” “private zoning,” or “spontaneous planning” identified by the 
terms of contra-state planning theorists.  
Errors of the dichotomy 
One problem with this dichotomy, even ignoring its historical and political origins 
in the competition between central planning based on authoritarianism and a market 
economy under democracy from 1917 to 1991, is a matter of logical tidiness.  First, 
everyone, whether an individual, a household, or a firm, plans.  Therefore, some find it 
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better to replace this dichotomy with the contradiction between the “public planning” 
of the state and the “private planning” of the market, as Thomas Sowell (1996) made 
clear.  Wildavsky (1973) also recognised the distinction between private and public 
planning while claiming that the latter was prone to failure. 
Sowell’s formulation is, nevertheless, far from satisfactory as soon as one 
realizes that private planning by a non-governmental body can be as imposing, 
discriminatory, and oppressive as public planning.  This is so notwithstanding a more 
sophisticated representation of the superiority of the private sector compared to the 
bureaucracy on knowledge discovery and innovation.  A classic example of oppressive 
private planning is private zoning in an Umbeck scenario of “might makes right” 
(Umbeck 1981), which is well-known to law enforcers. 
On the other hand, what Wildavsky or Sowell seemed to ignore was that public 
planning can be highly successful as a matter of public consent and dollar vote.  These 
allow it to employ market creativity without infringing on the public interest.  Such 
planning surely cannot be unilaterally imposed by edict, but is open to market forces.  
Any government plan produced in this manner is an offer rather than an order and is a 
vehicle for attaining a synthesis of public and private interest by mutual agreement.  
This may sound too good to be true, but it has come true in many places around the 
world like Singapore, Hong Kong, and China (Lai 1995). 
A taxonomy of planning 
The reality is that planning can be done as a matter of edict or as a matter of contract.  
It can be performed by the state or the market.  Therefore, the heart of the matter 
discussed above can be summarised in the form of a 2 X 2 matrix (Table 2) with planning 
bodies (i.e., the state and private parties) as separate planning agents in one dimension 
and consensual and non-consensual planning as distinct modes of planning in another.  
The matrix is meant to describe, rather than to evaluate,10 four distinct, though related, 
modes of planning.  Being a social construct in its own right, the matrix shows the 
contents defined by attributes that are recognised or at least recognizable in common 
law terms, which are in line with endeavours in the field economic analysis of law. 
As a useful analytical aid, the matrix reveals four scenarios: A, B, C, and D.  A 
third dimension, categorization, can be added, depending on whether the planning 
criteria will be based on purely static market efficiency or dynamic efficiency, the latter 
of which is more commonly known as sustainable development.  Dynamic efficiency can 
                                                                 
10 For a useful reference, see Alexander and Faludi (1989). 
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be operationally defined as the conversion of negative into positive externalities to 
achieve “win-win solutions” via Schumpeterian innovations (Lai and Lorne 2006; Lai and 
Lorne 2014).  However, to show contrast only with the old paradigm, this paper will not 
further elaborate on the third dimension of categorization.  As one can see from Table 2, 
like private planning, planning by contract initiated by the state, which is in agreement 
with the communicative turn for planning stressing social justice by Forester, Friedmann, 
Healey, and Innes (Lai 2010), opens vast opportunities to areas where the Coase 
Theorem can apply (Lai and Hung 2008).  Suffice it to say that the distinction in this 
matrix between “planning by contract” and “planning by edict,” which are alternative 
modes of planning available to and used by the state and any non-governmental party, 
is more accurate than the plan-market dichotomy of old. 
Table 2: Two dimensions of planning 
Planning body Actual mode of planning 
Planning by edict: 
non-consensual 
(obligatory) 
Planning by contract: 
consensual 
(contractual) 
The state/ 
government 
Planning by edict via 
legislation 
 
 
 
 
A 
Planning by contract under 
the leasehold land system 
based on the sale of 
leasehold interests (e.g. 
Hong Kong; China’s land 
use rights reforms) 
B 
Private firms/individuals “Might makes right” 
(e.g. triad zoning) 
 
Strategic planning within a 
business firm that adopts a 
top-down decision making 
process 
 
 
 
A property management 
company that has been 
authorized the right to 
edict.  
 
 
 
C 
“Private planning” (e.g. via 
restrictive covenants, as in 
the case of Houston; 
company law, as in the case 
of Shek O Development 
Company); “Spontaneous 
planning” 
 
Strategic planning in 
bottom-up decision making 
companies. 
 
Property management 
companies that run 
democratically in the sense 
that benefit the owners of a 
condo as a whole increases. 
D 
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Cells of the matrix 
Those misguided by the dichotomy assume that the only form of planning is A, 
while libertarians assume that D is the only form of “private planning”.  Hayek (1941, 
1960) and Wildavsky (1973), like Tomlinson (1987), were victims of this dichotomy.  
Both sides ignore the existence of B, which is practiced in China, but actually began in 
Colonial Hong Kong.  Early on, Lai distinguished between planning by edict and that by 
contract by identifying these examples in a series of works (1995, 1996a, 1997a, 1998, 
2010).  However, he only applied the distinction to A and B and has not dealt with C or D 
in relation to A and B. 
In terms of logic, planning, as defined above in line with Wildavsky’s view that it 
involves an element of being able to control the future, can be exhaustively described 
by five ‘predicables’.  They are ‘genus’, ‘species’, ‘specific differences’, ‘properties’, and 
‘accidents’.  The ‘genus’ of planning is that it is a conscious device to control land uses 
and built forms.  It has two ‘species’, one by edict and the other by contract or voluntary 
consent.(Lai forthcoming)   This is the subject of our discussion.  The ‘specific 
differences’ between these two species of planning is the absence or presence of 
mutual consent between the state and the land user.  The ‘property’ of both species of 
planning are an ability to control land use and the built form of delineated urban and 
non-urban areas.  Matters such as minimum lot size, location of ingress/egress, setbacks, 
scale, geographical coverage, and presentational methods of prescribing and 
implementing controls are ‘accidents’.  In other words, there are two alternative 
‘species’ of town plan. 
Few outside the field of neo-institutional economics realize that C can exist.  It 
subsists in the form of “might makes right” and is usually practiced by private parties 
that wield near or total monopolistic information and financial power and underground 
societies. 
Planning by contract in B involves both state planning and market planning not 
as a dualistic form of “mixed economy” (or “market socialism”) or an artificial 
partnership, but as something united organically by contract. 
One viable and successful form of planning by contract is the public sale of a 
state-produced land use and development plan in the form of leasehold interests to 
developers.  The lease consists of both positive and restrictive covenants that represent 
the public interest and the market casts a dollar vote on this plan to give the state and 
other economic players vital information, collected and disseminated through an open 
and reliable two-way public information system of land data (Lai et al. 2014), on the 
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market’s reaction to a particular plan with terms adjustable at the margins for a given 
locality.  This planning option embodies active state planning; unfettered operation of 
the common law, including freedom and privity of contract and the property law; and is 
Pareto-efficient, as the terms of the lease can be fine-tuned according to the terms of 
years, development intensity, and degrees of freedom in land use, etc.  The question of 
equity (i.e., affordability) can be handled by social redistribution using revenue obtained 
by selling leasehold interests.  Objections to this system on the grounds that there is no 
“public participation” are hardly valid, as the land auction eliminates any chance of 
corruption and favoritism that is very typical of A in non-price allocation regimes. 
Relationship of cells 
It is easier to identify the types of planning and depict them according to a scheme of 
classification, but it is something else to interpret the possible relationship between the 
types.  Some basic neo-institutional economic theory should offer some generalisations. 
 The four types of planning can co-exist, though, of course, the extent of each in 
the real world depends on the nature of the political economy of planning.  Although 
distinct, these four types of planning are not autonomous: A cannot work if it is so 
restrictive that no private development can take place, according to D, which is not 
completely autonomous and presupposes some form of A or B as a “framework” or 
“foundation,” if not a regulatory screen in the public interest. 
The example of planning by might in Type C is certainly a residual form in any 
well-governed civil society.  This proposition is consistent with the state as a monopoly 
of protection because even a monopoly does not serve all consumers.  However, if it 
expands at the expense of any other form, civil society would collapse.  Therefore, we 
may safely preclude it from further discussion. 
 Interventionists would intellectually favour A, would not trust C, or believe that B 
can work.  Vested interests would use their arguments to promote A institutionally at 
the expense of D and even B, although the latter allows the state to play an active 
forward planning role.  However, for the time being, C is gaining a larger audience 
because real world examples of “private planning” go back to Siegan’s “non-zoning” 
work of 1974 – though without appreciating the ways state planning has provided active 
assistance or at least served as a “framework” or “foundation” for the “invisible hand”. 
Ideally, types A, B, C, and D have their proper and complementary roles to play in 
an economy, depending on the transaction cost advantage of the state vis-à-vis the 
market as an agent of decision-making and implementation.  Each type is a kind of 
“institutional arrangement”. 
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The first Coase Theorem holds that some delimitation of rights is essential for 
market transactions.  Whereas the state defines property rights by way of planning, 
whether in terms of A or B, a market can emerge.  This is surely more pronounced for 
regimes formerly under central economic planning.  In terms of the second and third 
Coase Theorems (i.e., the invariance and optimality theorem), assuming that transaction 
costs are zero and property rights are clearly defined, the resource implications of each 
cell are identical and equally efficient.  In fact, in that ideal world of zero transaction 
costs, there is no need to plan or innovate.  Indeed, not even property rights are 
necessary.  In the real world, however, as transaction costs are not zero, there can be 
huge efficiency variations under different institutional arrangements.  The selection of 
the wrong cell may lead to a great loss of static efficiency and damage to innovation. 
From a transaction cost perspective, a contractual arrangement is generally 
more efficient than one imposed by the state, as no element of compulsion or 
bureaucratic costs is involved.  However, some basic state planning in A, according to 
the “Fourth Coase Theorem” (Lai and Lorne, 2013), can help expand planning in other 
cells, notably B and D.  Planning by restrictive covenants in Houston, as reported by 
Siegan, is a case in point.  Private planning there, C, took place within a framework of 
road network and building codes imposed by the state, A. 
Discussion and conclusion 
The struggle between pro-planning and pro-market theorists, both victims of the false 
plan-market dichotomy, has produced a list of propositions, which state that: 
(1) the Plan should, can, and even will predictably replace the Market; 
(2) the Plan is the remedy of the Market, which is inherently defective; 
(3) the Plan tends to fail to remedy market failures, if any, though this depends on 
transaction costs; 
(4) the Plan always disrupts the market and fails to deliver its promises; 
(5) the Market works best as a matter of private property under the rule of law in 
the absence of government planning regulation; and 
(6) the Market can plan on its own in the absence of any government planning 
involvement. 
Proposition (1) is a Marxist-socialist, central economic planning doctrine.  Few 
dare openly publicize this and only one country in the world practically adheres to it.  
Proposition (2) is a Pigovian interventionist stance.  Proposition (3) is a neutral Coasian 
view, which is best expounded by Dahlman (1979).  Propositions (4) and (5) summarise 
the libertarian, Hayekean (Hayek 1944), and anti-planning views and father (6) in the 
form of a looming private or spontaneous planning movement. 
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The interventionist can only see the problems of planning in the market (i.e., 
market failure), while libertarians refuse to accept that the state has a necessary role to 
play in the economy.  Coasians keep a theoretically neutral stance, but have little faith in 
state intervention.  The plan-market dichotomy, as summarised in Table 1, is a false one 
because planning is done also by the market and the state can play a role in the market 
as a party to planning and development contracts.  Planning and the market are not 
mutually exclusive, but inclusive.  The market is not always as efficient as libertarians 
believe and planning can be contractual.  The matrix presented in Table 2 should 
provide a platform for discussion on planning granted that everyone, good or bad, plans, 
as a matter of transaction costs or whatnot.  As planning is necessary in all civil societies, 
then it must be good for something as a starting point.  How good it is depends on the 
social objects (say, efficiency or environmental concerns) and how the planning system 
itself is “planned” (i.e., designed).  Some non-imposing innovations in planning, like 
“performance planning” and “indicative planning,” are useful, as they help constellate 
information in the sense of Schuster (2005) and do not appear to fall into any of the 
four cells in Table 2.  Upon a closer look, they are a mild form of planning by edict and 
certainly are not non-contractual.  While they also have great potential for rent-seeking 
and dissipation due to the presence of bureaucratic discretion, they are certainly more 
friendly to private planning. 
 In the old plan-market debate, “master planning” or “comprehensive planning” 
by the state is seen solely a way to “control the future” by subduing the market.  It was 
ideologically assailed by pro-market critics as unrealistic, even though they were ample 
examples of successful government-led planning that were subsequently mimicked and 
improved by large developers in the private sector.  Constrained by budget cuts, 
planning schools gradually lost teachers with practical experience to teach layout 
planning, so courses on “physical planning” and “urban design” which focus on blue 
prints or layouts with specific spatial coordinates, have disappeared from many planning 
programmes.  No planning books or journal articles from the late 1970s advocated or 
even discussed comprehensive plans or physical planning.  From 1960 to 1990, only one 
single (non-planning) English article was found in Google Scholar dealing with the 
Hippodamian grid (Grammenos et al. 2008), which was the iron grid adopted to plan 
New York, Philadelphia, West Kowloon, etc. At the same time, massive master and 
comprehensive planning for private development is being executed in rapidly growing 
and developing nations like China.  Such development is planned by contract within a 
basic state land use-transport planning framework.  Those who are involved in drafting 
these plans, by and large, have little to gain learning about master planning in planning 
schools outside China.  The old dichotomy has a lot to do with this mismatch between 
teaching and practice.  Surely, planning always has a social, economic, or even political 
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dimension. However, without a blue print or layout or what is called a “red line map” 
(He 2000) in China, no meaningful articulation is possible. 
The author hopes that this article will kindle an interest in physical planning 
based on its primeval foundation (land/property boundary delineation), which is often 
the same as road alignment (i.e., zoning in its generic sense) as an important dimension 
of development.  While not a case for physical determination, such planning is 
theoretically significant, as the state is inevitably involved, as the history of the opening 
up of the West in the United States (Allen 1991) revealed. 
 Without an understanding of where and why ONLY the state can truly do for 
town and country planning, theoretical attempts to remove it from the planning scene 
would ruin the basic fabric that is essential for enabling the maximum freedom and 
creativity of the individual in land use in everyone’s interest.  It can also distort the 
correct understanding of the individual as a choice-making being, which is distinct from 
purely instinct-driven beings like ants or bees.  The beehive, though of perfect 
architecture that has changed little throughout time, is unplanned and spontaneous in 
that sense.  Such spontaneity is not the result of choice, which is what planning is truly 
about.  While a person does not need to impose a law or make an agreement with 
oneself to carry out one’s personal plans, planning involving more than one conscious 
person needs to be on the basis of orders and/or agreements, which sound planning 
theory cannot ignore. 
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